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Why Petrella v. MGM Guarantees Patentees Six Years Of Prefiling Damages 
Dan Worleyi 
I. Introduction 
 
This Comment examines and analyzes the impact of Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 
Inc.1 on the equitable defense of laches in patent law.  The issue before the Supreme Court in 
Petrella was “whether the equitable defense of laches (unreasonable, prejudicial delay in 
commencing suit) may bar relief on a copyright infringement claim brought within § 507(b)’s 
three-year limitation period.”2  Justice Ginsburg, writing for the 6-3 majority, held that a defendant 
cannot invoke the equitable defense of laches to preclude adjudication of a claim for copyright 
infringement brought within the three-year window prescribed by Congress.3  The Court reasoned 
that “[t]o the extent that an infringement suit seeks relief solely for conduct occurring within the 
limitations period . . . courts are not at liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of 
suit.”4  Laches is not properly applied when a statute has a statute of limitations because laches is 
a “gap-filling, not legislation-overriding” defense.5  Although Petrella only addressed the impact 
of a statute of limitations on laches in copyright law and explicitly stated that it was not addressing 
the Patent Act6, the decision casts doubt on the viability of laches in patent law.7   
                                                          
1 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014). 
2 Id. at 1967. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 1974. 
6 Id. at n.15. 
7 Todd Vare, “Raging Bull” Copyright Opinion May Impact Patent Cases, LAW 360 (May 27, 2014 12:30PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/541533/raging-bull-copyright-opinion-may-impact-patent-cases (“Given the 
similarity of [section 286 of the Patent Act and section 507(b) of the Copyright Act], the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Petrella may call into question the applicability of laches to patent infringement claims.”); Bill Donahue, “Raging 
Bull” Will Be A Fight In The Patent Ring, LAW 360 (May 29, 2014, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/542427/raging-bull-will-be-a-fight-in-the-patent-ring (noting that the Petrella 
opinion “took a fairly settled situation in patent law and, at the very least, opened it up for debate”). 
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The leading case on the equitable defense of laches in patent law is A.C. Aukerman Co. v. 
R.L. Chaides Construction Co.8  In Aukerman, the plaintiff-appellant, Aukerman, argued that 
“where an express statute of limitations applies against a claim, laches cannot apply within the 
limitations period.”9   The 9-1 en banc opinion, written by Chief Judge Nies, rejected the plaintiff-
appellant’s argument.10  In so rejecting, the court noted that “section 286 [of the Patent Act] is not 
a statute of limitations in the sense of barring a suit for infringement.”11  Rather, the effect of § 
286 is to “limit recovery to damages for infringing acts committed within 6 years of the date of the 
filing of the infringement action,” a process that is done “arbitrarily” and in the absence of any 
other “impediment to recovery or maintenance of the suit such as application of the doctrine of 
laches.”12  The Federal Circuit also rejected the plaintiff-appellant’s second argument that it was 
improper to bar recovery for damages flowing from a continuing tort, such as patent 
infringement.13  The court concluded that laches does not have to be established for each infringing 
act because “continuous tortious acts may be deemed to constitute a unitary claim.”14  Importantly, 
the court based its decision on the apparent conflict with Supreme Court precedent in which laches 
had been applied against continuing torts.15  Part II of this Comment will summarize the equitable 
defense of laches in patent law and will further analyze the Aukerman decision.16 
The remainder of the Comment will focus on the impact of the Petrella decision.  Part III 
will develop the facts of Petrella and explain how the combination of a federally prescribed statute 
                                                          
8 A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
9 Id. at 1030 (emphasis in original). 
10 Id. (“We are unpersuaded that section 286 [of the Patent Act] should be interpreted to preclude the defense of 
laches and provide, in effect, a guarantee of six years damages regardless of equitable considerations arising from 
delay in assertion of one’s rights.”). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 1031.  
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 See infra Part II. 
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of limitations and the separate-accrual rule in copyright law has effectively erased the equitable 
defense of laches from the copyright lexicon.17  Part IV will discuss SCA Hygiene Products 
Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC,18 the Federal Circuit’s first opinion subsequent 
to Petrella involving the application of the equitable defense of laches in patent law.19  Part V will 
argue that the Federal Circuit in SCA Hygiene incorrectly interpreted Petrella and will explain why 
the Petrella opinion will inevitably impact patent law.20  Part V will also argue that § 286 of the 
Patent Act, although not a claim-barring statute of limitations, is still a timeframe prescribed by 
Congress that will be impacted by the Petrella.21  Lastly, Part V argues that Petrella guarantees 
patentees six years of prefiling damages because patent infringement is a continuing tort that, 
similar to copyright infringement, applies the separate-accrual rule.22  Part VI will conclude this 
Comment by arguing that SCA Hygiene should be taken up by the en banc Federal Circuit or, 
alternatively, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in order to reject the continuing viability 
of the equitable defense of laches in patent law for barring damages incurred within six years of 
filing suit.23 
 
II. The Equitable Defense Of Laches In Patent Law 
 
This part of the Comment will provide a general overview of the equitable defense of laches 
in patent law.  Part A will summarize how a defendant may utilize laches as a defense to a claim 
                                                          
17 See infra Part III. 
18 SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, No. 2013-1564, 2014 US App. LEXIS 17830 
(Fed. Cir. Sep. 17, 2014). 
19 See infra Part IV 
20 See infra Part V. 
21 See infra Part V. 
22 See infra Part V. 
23 See infra Part VI. 
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for patent infringement.  Part B will analyze Aukerman, the leading case on the application of 
laches in patent law.  Part C will summarize the precedential effect of Aukerman. 
 
A. Overview Of The Equitable Defense Of Laches 
 
Section 282 of the Patent Act is the statutory basis for the equitable defense of laches.24  
Although the text does not explicitly provide for the defense of laches,25 the application of laches 
to a claim of patent infringement “was well established at the time of recodification of the patent 
laws in 1952.”26  The commentary of one of the drafters of the Patent Act of 1952 confirms 
Congress’ intention to retain the defense of laches.27  The first paragraph of § 282 of the Patent 
Act “include[s] ‘equitable defenses such as laches, estoppel and unclean hands.’”28 
Laches was initially a defense to a patent-infringement action brought in equity.29  As 
previously stated, laches extended into suits at law and was a well-established defense to a claim 
of patent infringement when the patent laws were recodified in 1952.30  In the legal context, laches 
is defined as “the neglect or delay in bringing suit to remedy an alleged wrong, which taken 
together with lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party and 
operates as an equitable bar.”31  Since laches was, and remains to be, equitable in nature, its 
                                                          
24 The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012); A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). (“Laches is cognizable under 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988) as an equitable defense to a claim 
for patent infringement.”). 
25 The relevant statutory language of § 282 cited by Aukerman reads: “The following shall be defenses in any action 
involving the validity or infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded: (1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for 
infringement, or unenforceability.”  Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1029 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 282). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. (citing P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Law, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 55 (West 1954)). 
28 Id. (quoting J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd. Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed Cir. 1984)). 
29 Id. at 1028. 
30 Id. at 1029. 
31 Id. at 1028–29. 
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determination is “committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and the trial judge’s 
discretion is reviewed by [the Federal Circuit] under the abuse of discretion standard.”32 
In order to establish the equitable defense of laches, the defendant must establish two 
elements: (1) the patentee’s delay in bringing the patent-infringement action was “unreasonable 
and inexcusable;” and (2) the defendant “suffered material prejudice attributable to the delay.”33  
A district court should consider these two elements and “all of the evidence and other 
circumstances to determine whether equity should intercede to bar pre-filing damages.”34  Thus, if 
the defendant successfully establishes these two elements, “the patentee’s claim for damages prior 
to suit may be barred.”35 
There is no specific duration of time that a court may determine is per se unreasonable 
when attempting to determine the first element to establish laches.36  However, if a patentee delays 
bringing suit “more than six years after the date the patentee knew or should have known of the 
alleged infringer’s activity,” a presumption of laches arises.37  If there is a presumption of laches, 
it shifts the burden of production38 to the plaintiff, but it does not shift the burden of persuasion.39  
A patentee’s delay in bringing suit is measured from “the time the plaintiff knew or reasonably 
should have known of the defendant’s alleged infringing activities to the date of the suit.”40  Thus, 
the first element only looks at the actions of the plaintiff. 
                                                          
32 Id. at 1028. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 1032 (“The length of time which may be deemed unreasonable has no fixed boundaries but rather depends 
on the circumstances.”). 
37 Id. at 1028. 
38 The burden of production is defined as “[a] party's duty to introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue 
decided by the fact-finder, rather than decided against the party in a peremptory ruling such as a summary judgment 
or a directed verdict.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
39 Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028.  The burden of persuasion is defined as “[a] party's duty to convince the fact-finder 
to view the facts in a way that favors that party.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
40 Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032. 
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There are two types of material prejudice that may be used to satisfy the second element of 
the laches defense, economic prejudice and evidentiary prejudice.41  The first type, evidentiary 
prejudice, may arise because a defendant may not be able to present a full and fair defense on the 
merits due to lack of available evidence.42  Examples of evidentiary prejudice are “the loss of 
records, the death of a witness, or the unreliability of memories of long past events.”43  Evidentiary 
prejudice undermines the ability of the court to fairly assess the facts of the case.44  The second 
type of material prejudice is economic prejudice.45  Economic prejudice considers the “change in 
the economic position of the alleged infringer during the period of delay.”46  Examples of economic 
prejudice may include situations where “a defendant and possibly others will suffer the loss of 
monetary investments or incur damages which likely would have been prevented by an earlier 
suit.”47  Either type of prejudice may be sufficient to establish the second element of the laches 
defense.48 
Despite the lack of explicit statutory guidance, the Federal Circuit has concluded that it had 
“no difficulty in reading section 286 harmoniously with the recognition under section 282 of the 
laches defense.”49  The following subpart will analyze the facts and holding of the en banc 
Aukerman opinion, which has served as the basis for the application of laches in patent law since 
it was decided in 1992. 
 
B. Analysis of Aukerman. 
                                                          
41 Id. at 1033. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. (emphasis in original) 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1030. 
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Plaintiff-appellant Aukerman initiated a patent-infringement suit against the defendant, 
Chaides, for the alleged infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 3,793,133 and 4,014,633.50  The patents-
in-suit related to “a method and device for forming concrete highway barriers capable of separating 
highway surfaces of different elevations.”51  In 1977, Aukerman entered into a license agreement 
with Gomaco Corp., which made Gomaco a licensee of Aukerman’s patents and required Gomaco 
to notify Aukerman of companies who purchased Gomaco’s product.52  Chaides subsequently 
purchased Gomaco’s product, and Gomaco informed Aukerman of Chaides’ purchase.53   
Upon receiving the notification of Chaides’ purchase, Aukerman’s counsel advised 
Chaides, by a letter dated February 13, 1979, that Chaides’ use of Gomaco’s product “raised ‘a 
question of infringement with respect to one or more of [Aukerman’s patents-in-suit]’ and offered 
Chaides a license.”54  Correspondence between Aukerman and Chaides continued for two months 
and concluded with Chaides stating Aukerman should sue them “for $200-$300 a year.”55  
Although the opinion does not make it clear, this $200-$300 figure was likely based on Chaides’ 
estimation of the damages based on the size of Chaides’ business.  After Chaides’ letter, “[t]here 
was no further correspondence or contact between the parties for more than eight years.”56 
In 1987, Aukerman became aware that Chaides had become a “substantial competitor” 
utilizing the patents-in-suit.57  This prompted Aukerman’s counsel to send another letter to Chaides 
on October 22, 1987, which threatened litigation.58  Both parties remained silent until August 2, 
                                                          
50 Id. at 1026. 
51 Id. (emphasis deleted). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1026–27. 
56 Id. at 1027. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
9 
 
1988 when Aukerman’s counsel again wrote Chaides and explained more fully Aukerman’s 
proposed licensing offer.59  Chaides did not respond to the August 2, 1988 letter.60  Aukerman then 
filed the present action with the district court on October 26, 1988.61 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary 
judgment to the defendant Chaides, holding that “the doctrine of laches and estoppel barred 
Aukerman’s claims for relief.”62  The court ruled determined that Aukerman’s delay of more than 
six years “shifted the burden to Aukerman to prove that its delay was reasonable and was not 
prejudicial to Chaides.”63  The court rejected Aukerman’s arguments that the delay was reasonable 
because Aukerman was involved in other litigation and Chaides’ infringement was de minimis.64 
On appeal, the panel decision of the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the case back 
to the district court because, in its view, which the en banc decision subsequently rendered 
erroneous,65 the district court “erred in placing the burden on Aukerman to rebut the presumption 
[of laches] rather than on Chaides to prove its equitable defenses.”66  The panel’s decision was 
vacated and withdrawn when the Federal Circuit granted a rehearing en banc.67 
The Federal Circuit reheard the case en banc “to reconsider the principles of laches and 
equitable estoppel in a patent infringement suit.”68  The plaintiff-appellant Aukerman made two 
arguments at the Federal Circuit, each of which will be addressed in turn below. 
 
                                                          
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1027. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1028. 
66 A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Co., No. 90-1137, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *27 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 25, 1991).  
67 A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Co., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11706 (Fed. Cir May 22, 1991) (en banc). 
68 Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1026. 
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1.Aukerman’s First Argument: The Recognition Of Laches Conflicts 
With § 286 Of The Patent Act. 
 
First, Aukerman argued that “the defense of laches is inapplicable, as a matter of law, 
against a claim for damages in patent infringement suits.”69  Aukerman reasoned that the 
“recognition of laches as a defense conflicts with 35 U.S.C. § 286” because § 286 “is comparable 
to a statute of limitations which effectively preempts the laches defense.”70  Section 286 provides, 
in relevant part: “Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall be had for any 
infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counterclaim 
for infringement in the action.”71  Importantly, the language of the statute has not changed since 
the Federal Circuit decided Aukerman.72  According to Aukerman’s argument, if § 286 were 
interpreted to be a statute of limitations, laches could not be applied.73 
The Federal Circuit not only rejected Aukerman’s argument that § 286 was the type of 
statute of limitations would make laches inapplicable, but it also rejected Aukerman’s position that 
laches cannot operate within a window created by a statute of limitations.74  First, as a threshold 
matter, the court found that even if § 286 were an express statute of limitations, “laches is routinely 
applied within the prescribed statute of limitations period for bringing the claim.”75  However, the 
court found that § 286 was “not a statute of limitations in the sense of barring a suit for 
infringement.”76  Rather, “the effect of section 286 is to limit recovery to damages for infringing 
                                                          
69 Id. at 1029. 
70 Id.  
71 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012). 
72 See Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1029 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1988)). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 1030. 
75 Id. (listing examples where laches has been to claims brought within the prescribed statute of limitations period). 
76 Id. (citing Standard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Kogyo Co., 754 F.2d 345, 347–48 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
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acts committed within six years of the date of the filing of the infringement action.”77  The Federal 
Circuit explained that § 286 functions by counting backwards six years from the date of the 
complaint to limit pre-filing damages, a process that is done “arbitrarily.”78  The recovery within 
this six years “assumes . . . no other impediment to recovery or maintenance of the suit such as 
application of the doctrine of laches.”79  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit was “unpersuaded that 
section 286 should be interpreted to preclude the defense of laches and provide, in effect, a 
guarantee of six years damages regardless of equitable considerations arising from delay in 
assertion of one’s rights.”80 
The Federal Circuit relied primarily on circuit precedent, the language of the statute, and 
legislative history when it determined that § 286 was not a true statute of limitations.  First, the 
court relied on the fact that the patent statute from 1870-1874 “contained an actual statute of 
limitations, which required ‘all actions for the infringement of patents shall be brought during the 
term for which letters patent shall be granted or extended, or within six years after the expiration 
thereof.’” 81  Although not explicitly stated by the court, it is reasonable to infer that since a true 
claim-barring statute is no longer present, Congress did not consider § 286 to be a statute of 
limitations because it knew how to write a claim-barring statute but elected not to do so when 
enacting § 286.  Second, the court stated that “[w]ithout exception, all circuits recognized laches 
as a defense to a charge of patent infringement despite the reenactment of the damages limitation 
[§ 286] in the 1952 statute.”82  Thus, according to the Federal Circuit, precedent and legislative 
history mandated the finding that laches can apply to § 286 of the Patent Act. 
                                                          
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at n.8 (quoting 16 Stat. 206, § 55 (July 8, 1870)). 
82 Id. 
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Although the Federal Circuit grounded its decision in legislative history and circuit 
precedent, the court concluded that it had “no difficulty in reading section 286 harmoniously with 
the recognition under section 282 of the laches defense” even when “looked at afresh.”83  The court 
reasoned that through § 286, “Congress imposed an arbitrary limitation on the period for which 
damages may be awarded on any claim for patent infringement.”84  The court further reasoned that 
since laches “invokes the discretionary power of the district court to limit the defendant’s liability 
for infringement by reason of the equities between the parties,” recognition of the defense would 
not “affect the general enforceability of the patent against others or the presumption of its validity 
under section 282.”85  Lastly, the court summarized that “[n]othing in section 286 suggests that 
Congress intended by reenactment of this damage limitation to eliminate the long recognized 
defense of laches or to take away a district court’s equitable powers in connection with patent 
cases.”86  The Federal Circuit concluded, contrary to Aukerman’s position, that a court’s 
discretionary powers under § 282 and the arbitrary limitation in § 286 do not conflict with one 
another.87   
 
2.Aukerman’s Second Argument: Laches Is An Improper Defense To 
Completely Bar Recovery Of Prefiling Damages From A Continuing 
Tort, Such As Patent Infringement 
 
                                                          
83 Id. 
84 Id. (emphasis in original). 
85 Id. (emphasis in original). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1030–31. 
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Aukerman’s second argument stated that “it is improper to utilize laches as a defense to 
completely bar recovery of prefiling damages flowing from a continuing tort, such as patent 
infringement.”88  The basis for Aukerman’s argument is that since each act of patent infringement 
is deemed a separate claim, the laches defense must be established separately for each and every 
act of infringement.89  The Federal Circuit disagreed, however, and noted that “Aukerman’s theory 
conflicts with the precedent of the Supreme Court in which laches has been applied against 
continuing torts.”90   
In rejecting Aukerman’s argument, the court reasoned that laches is “a single defense to a 
continuing tort up to the time of the suit, not a series of individual defenses which must be proved 
as to each act of infringement, at least with respect to infringing acts of the same nature.”91  With 
respect to laches, “continuing tortious acts may be deemed to constitute a unitary claim.”92  The 
Federal Circuit subsequently reaffirmed its ruling in Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, 726 F.2d 734 
(Fed Cir. 1984) and held that “laches is available as a defense to a suit for patent infringement.”93  
As a result, the court rejected Aukerman’s second argument and concluded that laches could bar 
his claim.94 
 
C. Effect Of Aukerman 
 
                                                          
88 Id. at 1031. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. (citing Supreme Court cases involving patent infringement and trademark infringement). 
91 Id. 
92 Id.  Patent infringement is a continuing tort because each act of infringement is a separate claim.  Id.  See Part 
III.B. infra for a further discussion of continuing torts. 
93 Id. at 1032. 
94 Id. 
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Aukerman has been the leading case on the application of laches in patent law for over 
twenty-two years; however, as the next part of this Comment will explain, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Petrella casts doubt on the long-term viability of Aukerman.  The petitioner in 
Petrella made essentially the same arguments made by Aukerman, and fortunately for Petrella, 
the Supreme Court found in her favor.  While there are some differences between patent law and 
copyright law,95 Part V of this Comment will explain that these differences are not so substantial 
that Petrella will not impact patent law.  Despite the differences between patent law and 
copyright law, the broad language of the Court in Petrella will inevitably impact patent law and 
the precedential value of Aukerman. 
 
III. The Impact Of Petrella On Copyright Law 
 
This part will go through the facts and holding of Petrella and will subsequently explain 
the impact of the opinion on the defense of laches in copyright law.  The facts of the case are 
relevant to give context to the Court’s analysis.  Similarly, it is important to understand the Court’s 
reasoning in order to appreciate why Petrella will extend into patent law.  Part A will summarize 
the relevant facts of Petrella.  Part B will analyze the Court’s reasoning in Petrella. 
 
A. Facts Of Petrella 
 
                                                          
95 Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit Defies Supreme Court in Laches Holding, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 21, 2014), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/09/federal-supreme-holding.html (noting that the copyright statute of limitations is 
more direct and the three-year limitation is a much lower percentage of the overall copyright term). 
15 
 
The copyrighted work at issue was a screenplay based on the life of former boxing 
champion Jake LaMotta.96  The screenplay, which was registered in 1963, is one of three 
copyrighted works that was made by LaMotta and his longtime friend Frank Petrella.97  In 1976, 
the duo assigned their rights in the three works, including the renewal rights, to a company that 
was later acquired by MGM.98  In 1980, MGM released the infringing work, a motion picture 
entitled Raging Bull.99  Frank Petrella subsequently died in 1981, ten years before the initial 
copyright expired.100  Under 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(C)(ii)-(iv), Paula Petrella inherited the renewal 
rights.101  And under the Supreme Court’s holding in Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990), MGM 
may only continue to use the copyrighted work if Paula Petrella transferred the renewal rights to 
them.102  She did not transfer the renewal rights, but MGM continued “to market the film, and has 
converted it into formats unimagined in 1980, including DVD and Blu-ray.”103 
In 1991, Paula Petrella timely renewed the copyright, but she did not contact MGM until 
1998.104  Petrella’s attorney and MGM disputed the validity of the copyright-infringement claims 
for the next two years.105  Petrella did not file suit until nine years later.106 
On January 6, 2009, the petitioner, Paula Petrella, filed a copyright-infringement action in 
the United States District Court for the Central District of California.107  Petrella sought monetary 
                                                          
96 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1970 (2014). 
97 Id.  The copyrights in the other two works were not timely renewed, so they are not at issue in this case.  Id. at 
1971. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1968. 
102 Id. (“[I]f an author who has assigned her rights away dies before the renewal period, then the assignee may 
continue to use the original work to produce a derivative work only if the author’s successor transfers the renewal 
rights to the assignee.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
103 Id. at 1971. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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and injunctive relief from MGM for its alleged violation of her copyright.108  Petrella only sought 
relief for “acts of infringement occurring on or after January 6, 2006,” which is exactly three years 
prior to the date she filed suit.109  MGM moved for summary judgment on several grounds, 
including the equitable defense of laches.110 
The district court granted MGM’s motion, reasoning that MGM was prejudiced by 
Petrella’s delay in bringing suit.111  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the laches-based dismissal.112  The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to 
“resolve a conflict among the Circuits on the application of the equitable defense of laches to 
copyright infringement claims brought within the three-year look-back period prescribed by 
Congress.”113 
 
B. Analysis Of Petrella 
 
The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Ninth Circuit because the Ninth Circuit 
failed “to recognize that the copyright statute of limitations, § 507(b), itself takes account of 
delay.”114  The Court noted that the statute of limitations in combination with the separate-accrual 
rule attending § 507(b) allows the copyright owner to recover damages within the three-year look-
back period prescribed in § 507(b).115  Accordingly, the Court held that laches “cannot be invoked 
to preclude adjudication of a claim for damages brought within the three-year window” prescribed 
                                                          
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 1971–72. 
112 Id. at 1972. 
113 Id. (noting the circuit split). 
114 Id. at 1973. 
115 Id.   
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by Congress.116  The Court reasoned that “courts are not at liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment 
on the timeliness of suit” when a copyright owner “seeks relief solely for conduct occurring within 
the limitations period.”117 
The Copyright Act did not include a statute of limitations for civil suits until 1957.118  Prior 
to 1957, courts used analogous state statutes of limitations for determining the timeliness of suit.119  
Those courts also occasionally invoked laches to abridge the state-law prescription.120  According 
to the Court, this is permissible because those courts were “merely filling a legislative hole.”121  In 
1957, however, Congress “addressed the matter and filled the hole” by enacting § 507(b) of the 
Copyright Act, which reads: “No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title 
unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”122  Subsequent to the enactment 
of a statute of limitations, laches could no longer be properly applied. 
A copyright infringement claim “ordinarily accrues when a plaintiff has a complete and 
present cause of action.”123  According to the Court, “[i]t is widely recognized that the separate-
accrual rule attends the copyright statute of limitations.”124  This means that the statute of 
limitations runs separately from each act of infringement.125  Thus, “each time an infringing work 
is reproduced or distributed, the infringer commits a new wrong.”126  Accordingly, under § 507(b), 
                                                          
116 Id. at 1967. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 1968. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. (quoting Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. V. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877, 881 (2d 
Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
122 Id. at 1968–69 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012)). 
123 Id. at 1969 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
124 Id. (citations omitted). 
125 Id.   
126 Id. 
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each infringing act is actionable for up to three years because the statute provides recovery for 
claims “commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”127   
 Laches may only be applied in “extraordinary circumstances.”128  The Petrella Court noted 
two cases in which there might be “extraordinary circumstances” that would warrant the invocation 
of laches: (1) Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 2007); and (2) New Era 
Publications Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).129  In Chirco, the Sixth Circuit 
held that the requested relief would be inequitable for two separate reasons.130  First, the plaintiffs 
knew of the defendant’s plan to create an allegedly infringing work and failed to take readily 
available measures to stop them.131  Second, the plaintiff’s requested relief “would work an unjust 
hardship upon the defendants and innocent third parties.”132  While these two examples of 
extraordinary circumstances are by no means exhaustive, the statute of limitations “leaves little 
place for a doctrine that would further limit the timeliness of a copyright owner’s suit.”133 
 In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, Petrella instructs that laches should not be 
applied to a claim for copyright infringement brought within the three-year window prescribed by 
Congress.134  Laches is a “gap-filling, not legislation-overriding defense.”135  If courts were able 
to individually determine the timeliness of suit, it would “tug against the uniformity Congress 
                                                          
127 The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012). 
128 Petrella, 134 S. Ct at 1977. 
129 Id. at 1978.  In Chirco, the defendants used the plaintiffs’ copyrighted architectural design.  Id.  The plaintiffs, 
long aware of defendants’ plans to build a housing project using their copyrighted design, took no steps to halt the 
project until more than 168 units were built, 109 of which were occupied.  Id.  Thus, granting the plaintiffs’ motion 
would work an unjust hardship on the defendants and innocent third parties.  Id.  In New Era, the plaintiff waited 
over two years to assert his rights.  Id.  The plaintiff waited until the infringing book was printed, packed, and 
shipped.  Id.  Granting plaintiff’s motion would have resulted in total destruction of the work.  Id. 
130 Id. (citing Chirco, 474 F.3d at 236).  
131 Id. (citing Chirco, 474 F.3d at 236). 
132 Id. (citing Chirco, 474 F.3d at 236) (emphasis in original). 
133 Id. at 1977 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 1974. 
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sought to achieve when it enacted § 507(b).”136  Subsequent to Petrella, the equitable defense of 
laches applies only to “claims of an equitable cast for which the Legislature has provided to fixed 
time limitation.”137 
  
IV. Current Status Of Laches In Patent Law Subsequent To Petrella: SCA Hygiene v. 
First Quality. 
 
On September 17, 2014, Circuit Judge Hughes, writing for a unanimous panel also 
including Circuit Judges Reyna and Wallach, concluded that Petrella did not compel a finding that 
Aukerman was no longer good law and that laches was still applicable to the Patent Act.138  This 
decision represents the Federal Circuit’s first opportunity to address Petrella, but the panel failed 
to deviate from Federal Circuit precedent.  The court noted that footnote 15 of the Petrella 
decision, which stated that the Supreme Court “had not had occasion to review the Federal 
Circuit’s position [in Aukerman],”139 left the en banc Aukerman decision intact.140  The Federal 
Circuit thus concluded that it was bound by Aukerman until the issue was decided by the Supreme 
Court or the Federal Circuit en banc.141 
As will be explained in Part V infra, the Federal Circuit failed to understand the clear 
import of the Petrella decision.142  Part V will explain why the SCA Hygiene decision erred in its 
                                                          
136 Id. at 1975. 
137 Id. at 1973. 
138 SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, No. 2013-1564, 2014 US App. LEXIS 
17830, at *9–10 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 17, 2014). 
139 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1974 n.15. 
140 SCA Hygiene, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17830 at *9–10. (“Because Aukerman may only be overruled by the 
Supreme Court or an en banc panel of this court, Aukerman remains controlling precedent.”). 
141 Id. at *10. 
142 See Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit Defies Supreme Court in Laches Holding, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 21, 2014), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/09/federal-supreme-holding.html (suggesting that the Federal Circuit’s reticence is 
due to the relatively new judges on the panel). 
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analysis of the Petrella opinion, which contains broad language that will impact patent law.  The 
Federal Circuit should have taken the opportunity to correct the injustice to patentees that 
Aukerman has caused for the past twenty-two years. 
 
V. Reasons Why Petrella Will Impact Patent Law 
 
This part will argue that the Federal Circuit in SCA Hygiene incorrectly interpreted Petrella 
and will explain why the Petrella opinion will impact patent law.  Although, as the Federal Circuit 
in SCA Hygiene correctly points out, the majority opinion in Petrella explicitly stated that it “had 
not had occasion to review the Federal Circuit’s position [in Aukerman],”143 the breadth of the 
language in Petrella is too expansive for laches to survive in patent law.  The paragraphs below 
further explain why the broad language in Petrella will allow patentees to recover six years of 
prefiling damages because laches cannot apply to bar the legal relief explicitly prescribed by 
Congress in § 286.  Part A will explain why § 286 is also a statute of limitations that will be 
impacted by Petrella.  Part B will discuss the separate-accrual rule attendant in both patent and 
copyright infringement.  Part C will show why public policy supports allowing patentees to recover 
six years of prefiling damages, regardless of the laches defense. 
 
A. Section 286 Of The Patent Act Is A Statute Of Limitations That Will Be 
Impacted By Petrella 
 
                                                          
143 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1974 n.15. 
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The Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Aukerman is directly contradicted by the broad language 
in Petrella.  The plaintiff-appellant in Aukerman made essentially the same argument that carried 
the day in Petrella.144  The Federal Circuit rejected Aukerman’s argument that laches could not be 
applied in the presence of a statute of limitations for two reasons.145  First, the Federal Circuit 
stated that “laches is routinely applied within the prescribed statute of limitations period for 
bringing the claim.”146  This is directly contradictory to the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement 
that it was not aware of any case in which it “approved the application of laches to bar a claim for 
damages brought within the time allowed by a federal statute of limitations.”147  The Federal 
Circuit’s second, alternative reasoning was its attempt to distinguish § 286 by stating that “section 
286 is not a statute of limitations in the sense of barring a suit for infringement.”148  Despite the 
Federal Circuit’s characterization of § 286 as “arbitrary,”149 the six-year period is still a limitation 
on damages.  In § 286, Congress explicitly stated that “no recovery shall be had for any 
infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counterclaim 
for infringement in the action.”150  The Petrella Court also rejected this type of reasoning when it 
noted that “in the face of a statute of limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot be invoked to 
bar legal relief.”151  Central to the Supreme Court’s holding was the “ongoing separation of legal 
and equitable remedies.”152  Since § 286 of the Patent Act is a statute of limitations, as will be 
                                                          
144 Compare A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc) 
(“Aukerman first argues that recognition of laches as a defense conflicts with 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1988)” because “this 
provision is comparable to a statute of limitations which effectively preempts the laches defense.”) with Petrella, 
134 S. Ct at 1971 (explaining that Ms. Petrella only sought damages within the three-year window created by the 
statute of limitations). 
145 Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1030.   
146 Id. 
147 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1974. 
148 Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1030. 
149 Id. 
150 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012). 
151 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1974. 
152 Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit Defies Supreme Court in Laches Holding, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 21, 2014), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/09/federal-supreme-holding.html. 
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explained in further detail below, the Federal Circuit in SCA Hygiene incorrectly determined that 
Petrella did not apply and that the Aukerman decision remains good law. 
 The Court in Petrella could not have been clearer that the Federal Circuit’s first line of 
reasoning, that laches may be applied within a timeframe prescribed by a statute of limitations, 
was faulty.  In fact, the Court explicitly stated in the first paragraph of its opinion that “[t]o the 
extent that an infringement suit seeks relief solely for conduct occurring within the limitations 
period . . . courts are not at liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of suit.”153  The 
Court later reasoned that this is because a statute of limitations “itself takes account of delay.”154    
Since laches is a “gap-filling, not legislation-overriding” device, laches is not properly applied 
when a statute has a statute of limitations.155  Thus, Petrella has directly and completely 
undermined the Federal Circuit’s first line of reasoning from Aukerman. 
While the Federal Circuit’s second line of reasoning was more involved and may appear 
to have more merit, it is also completely undermined by Petrella.  As the Federal Circuit correctly 
observed, § 286 of the Patent Act is not a statute of limitations, in that it does not bar a suit for 
infringement.156  However, it is still a statute of limitations because Congress has prescribed a six-
year limitation on damages.157  In fact, the Federal Circuit itself recognized that § 286 is still a type 
of statute of limitations when it stated that “section 286 is not a statute of limitations in the sense 
of barring a suit for infringement.”158  By recognizing that § 286 was not a statute of limitations 
“in the sense of barring a suit for infringement,” the court is implicitly stating that it is still a statute 
of limitations, though in a different sense.  In light of Congress’ decision to enact § 286, the 
                                                          
153 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1967. 
154 Id. at 1973. 
155 Id. 
156 A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
157 See 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012). 
158 Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1030 (emphasis added). 
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application of the equitable defense of laches by the courts would improperly override the intent 
of the statute by “setting a time limit other than the one Congress prescribed.”159  As stated by 
Petrella, “in the face of a statute of limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot be invoked to 
bar legal relief.”160  Section 286 is a statute of limitations, no matter which “sense” the Federal 
Circuit would like to view it in, so courts should not be able to apply laches to limit a patentee 
from collecting six years of prefiling damages.  Even though the Patent Act does not have a statute 
of limitations that bars the suit entirely (as in § 507(b) of the Copyright Act), a court cannot elect 
to fill the “legislative hole” and invoke laches to bar the suit when doing so would bar the six years 
of legal relief explicitly provided for by Congress when it enacted § 286. 
Section 286 of the Patent Act161 and § 507(b) of the Copyright Act162 both represent 
statutory windows created by Congress to limit recovery by the owner of the intellectual property.  
Although § 507(b) of the Copyright Act limits all relief, both legal and equitable and § 286 of the 
Patent Act only limits legal relief, the two statutes are nonetheless statutorily-prescribed 
limitations.  In both statutes, Congress created a window for the recovery of legal relief, a window 
in which the courts should not attempt to close with equitable remedies.163  The following timelines 
demonstrate the operation of both statutes: 
 
Copyright Infringement - § 507(b): 
 
                                                          
159 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1975. 
160 Id. at 1974. 
161 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012).  Section 286 provides in relevant part “no recovery shall be had for any infringement 
committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action.”  
Id. 
162 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012).  Section 507(b) provides in relevant part “[n]o civil action shall be maintained under 
the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”  Id. 
163 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1967 (“To the extent that an infringement suit seeks relief solely for conduct occurring 
within the limitations period . . . courts are not at liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of suit.”). 
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Patent Infringement - § 286: 
 
 
 
Section 507(b) “bars relief of any kind for conduct occurring prior to the three-year limitations 
period.”164  Section 286 does not bar “relief of any kind,” but does “limit recovery to damages for 
infringing acts committed within six years of the date of the filing of the infringement action.”165  
As the timelines illustrate, the function of the two statutes is the same – to limit the recovery of the 
claimant.  For copyright infringement, an alleged infringer may infringe at any point within the 
orange box labeled “initial infringement,” but the copyright owner can seek relief of any kind for 
infringements occurring within the three-year window created by § 507(b), as depicted by the 
green box.  Similarly for patent infringement, an alleged infringer may initially infringe at any 
point within the orange box, but a patentee can only bring suit for damages within the 6-year 
window created by § 286, as depicted by the green box.   
Both statutes represent an express decision by Congress to limit the amount of legal relief 
available to an owner of intellectual property, six years for patent owners and three years for a 
                                                          
164 Id. 
165 A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
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copyright owner.166  Admittedly, § 507(b) also limits equitable remedies; however, it also limits 
legal relief.  An important element of the Court’s holding was “the ongoing separation of legal and 
equitable remedies.”167  As stated by the majority in Petrella, the “principal application [of laches] 
was, and remains, to claims of an equitable cast for which the Legislature has provided no fixed 
time limitation.”168  Invoking the equitable defense of laches to bar legal relief would improperly 
constrict the six-year window in § 286 of the Patent Act and would set “a time limit other than the 
one Congress prescribed.”169  The Petrella opinion is not limited to “true” statutes of limitations, 
which bar all forms of relief, both legal and equitable.  The Court made this clear when it stated 
that the Court “adhere[s] to the position that, in the face of a statute of limitations enacted by 
Congress, laches cannot be invoked to bar legal relief.”170  The Federal Circuit cannot sidestep 
Petrella by invoking laches to bar the entire suit or any equitable remedies because the Patent 
Act’s statute of limitations is only directed toward legal relief.  This is because invoking laches 
would bar the six years of legal relief explicitly provided for by Congress when it enacted § 286.  
Thus, applying laches against a claim for damages in a patent-infringement suit would 
impermissibly bar a patentee’s claim for legal relief, which is in direct opposition to both the statute 
and Petrella. 
 
B. The Separate-Accrual Rule Links Patent And Copyright Infringement 
                                                          
166 Todd Vare, “Raging Bull” Copyright Opinion May Impact Patent Cases, LAW 360 (May 27, 2014 12:30PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/541533/raging-bull-copyright-opinion-may-impact-patent-cases (“Although 
worded differently, the effect of Section 507(b) and Section 286 is the same: A plaintiff can only recover damages 
for acts of infringement occurring within the statutorily prescribed number of years prior to the filing of the 
lawsuit.”). 
167 Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit Defies Supreme Court in Laches Holding, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 21, 2014), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/09/federal-supreme-holding.html (discussing the impact of Petrella on patent law). 
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The separate-accrual rule, which applies to both patent infringement171 and copyright 
infringement172 further demonstrates § 286 of the Patent Act and § 507(b) of the Copyright Act 
should be treated similarly.  The separate-accrual rule states that “when a defendant commits 
successive violations, the statute of limitations runs separately from each violation.”173  Thus, 
“[e]ach wrong gives rise to a discrete ‘claim’ that ‘accrues’ at the time the wrong occurs.”174  
Applying this to the above timelines, any infringement that occurs within the orange box is outside 
of recovery for the plaintiff, but since both patent infringement and copyright infringement are 
continuing torts175 that apply the separate-accrual rule, all violations occurring within the green 
boxes of the timelines can be recovered by the plaintiff because each claim separately accrues.176  
Thus, recovery of damages for infringements that accrue within the green box is consistent with 
the language of § 286, which provides that “no recovery shall be had for any infringement 
committed for than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counterclaim for infringement 
in the action.”177   
As noted by Petrella, it is the combination of the separate-accrual rule and the three-year 
window created by § 507(b) of the Copyright Act, that entitled Petrella to damages.178 The 
plaintiff-appellant in Aukerman made this exact argument, but unfortunately for Aukerman, the 
Federal Circuit rejected it.179  Importantly, Aukerman, which predated Petrella, did not have the 
                                                          
171 A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
172 Petrella, 134 S. Ct at 1969. 
173 Id.; accord Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1031. 
174 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1969. 
175Id. (noting that copyright infringement is a continuing tort); Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1031 (noting that patent 
infringement is a continuing tort). 
176 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1969; Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1031. 
177 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012). 
178 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1973. 
179 Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1031 (“Aukerman asserts that it is improper to utilize laches as a defense to completely 
bar recovery of prefiling damages flowing from a continuing tort, such as patent infringement.”). 
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benefit of the Petrella opinion to guide its reasoning.180  Petrella would have supplied the requisite 
Supreme Court precedent to support plaintiff-appellant Aukerman’s argument.  Thus, the separate-
accrual rule further illustrates why § 286 of the Patent Act and § 507(b) of the Copyright Act 
should be treated similarly. 
 
C. Public Policy Also Supports Guaranteeing Six Years Of Prefiling Damages 
 
In addition to the text of the statute and black letter law, public policy also guided the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella.181  The Court in Petrella noted that “[i]t is hardly incumbent 
on copyright owners . . . to challenge each and every actionable infringement.”182  The Court 
reasoned that some infringements may actually benefit the copyright owner and that “there is 
nothing untoward about waiting to see whether an infringer’s exploitation undercuts the value of 
the copyrighted work, has no effect on the original work, or even compliments it.”183  Even in 
situations where the infringement is potentially harmful, “the harm may be too small to justify the 
cost of litigation.”184 
Similarly in patent law, in the absence of laches, a patentee has no duty to exploit or enforce 
his patent rights.  Just as in copyright law, some patent infringements may be beneficial to the 
patent owner.  For example, a patentee may have a patent over a wireless mouse.  A laptop 
computer manufacturer with a very small market share may manufacture and sell a laptop 
computer with the USB-attachment required to use the patentee’s mouse embedded within the 
                                                          
180 Aukerman relied on the lack of Supreme Court precedent which failed to apply laches to a continuing tort.  Id. 
181 See Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1976. 
182 Id. 
183 Id.   
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laptop itself but not the mouse itself.  This would likely cause consumers to purchase the patentee’s 
mouse because they would not have to occupy an external USB port for the use of a different 
wireless mouse.  In this example, the laptop computer manufacturer infringed the patent, but it 
also expanded the market for the patentee’s wireless mouse, which is beneficial to the patentee 
because the patentee will be able to sell more of its patented product.  Public policy would not 
support requiring this patentee to enforce its patent. 
Also, the extreme expense associated with patent litigation supports the conclusion that a 
patentee should not be forced to enforce his patents.  In its 2013 Report of the Economic Survey, 
the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) estimated that a patent-infringement 
suit with less than $1 million at stake cost $350 thousand dollars through the end of discovery and 
$700 thousand through the end of trial.185  Obviously, if the cost of litigation is $700 thousand, it 
would not make financial sense to challenge small infringements that might be harmful.  This is 
especially true since the $700 thousand figure does not represent the cost of appeal.   
The separate-accrual rule in combination with the six-year limitation on damages provided 
in § 286 of the Patent Act allows Petrella to extend into patent law.  If Petrella had been decided 
before Aukerman, it is likely that the Federal Circuit would have agreed with the arguments made 
by Aukerman and concluded that laches cannot prevent a patentee from recovering six years of 
prefiling damages.  Public policy and Supreme Court precedent support this conclusion.  
Subsequent to Petrella, a patentee should be guaranteed damages for the most recent six years as 
a result of the separate-accrual rule in combination with the statute of limitations prescribed by 
Congress in § 286 of the Patent Act. 
 
                                                          
185 AIPLA, 2013 Report of the Economic Survey, available at http://library.constantcontact.com/download 
/get/file/1109295819134-177/AIPLA+2013+Survey_Press_Summary+pages.pdf.  
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VI. Conclusion 
 
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari on the SCA Hygiene case because, as this 
Comment explained in Part V, the Petrella decision will inevitably impact patent jurisprudence.   
Alternatively, the Federal Circuit should be proactive and rehear the SCA Hygiene case en banc.  
This could spare the Federal Circuit another “slap”186 from the Supreme Court, and avoid another 
Supreme Court opinion stating that the Federal Circuit “fundamentally misunderstands”187 the 
Supreme Court’s precedent.  Either way, it is important that lower courts understand the clear 
implications of the Petrella decision. 
It is unjust for patentees who have waited to sue longer than six years to be barred from 
recovery under § 286 of the Patent Act by laches when the Supreme Court in Petrella made clear 
that “in the face of a statute of limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot be invoked to bar 
legal relief.”188  Since patent infringement and copyright infringement are continuing torts that 
apply the separate-accrual rule and there is a statute of limitations in both the Patent Act and the 
Copyright Act, laches should be applied in the same way, regardless of the intellectual property at 
issue.  Therefore, to avoid injustice to patentees, the Federal Circuit should rehear the SCA Hygiene 
case en banc or the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to explicitly overrule Aukerman and 
affirmatively establish that patentees are guaranteed six years of prefiling damages under § 286 of 
the Patent Act. 
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